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Section of the research project on natural semiosis Components
Description The characteristics of perceptual space are very similar to those of pictorial space, given that they are characterized by a sort of extendedness which unfolds dynamically, and which shows a close analogy between the performance of an act of cognition and of an act of design. On the basis of diverse areas of expertise – comprising mathematics, philosophy, experimental philosophy and computer engineering, the project intends to analyse certain structures of the dynamic of the visual percept. More specifically, it will examine how the field of visual tensions undergoes changes in relation to perturbations due to the observer’s presence and movement analogously to what happens in the ideation and creation of a work of art, whether a painting, a sculpture or an artefact. From this point of view, analysis of the artistic theories of Kandinsky, Klee, Arnheim, etc., is an integral part of the project, for these theories consider the perceiver (also in the sense of the drawer, the sculptor, etc.) to be part of the field itself of forces and of the process of segmenting the field into figure/ground, texture segmentation, according to the type and direction of the conceptual project that informs the creative action. Starting with the architecture of the cortical mechanisms that reconstruct visible surfaces from retinal signals, the project seeks to find elements in favour of (or against) the medial axis, extreme curvature and multiscale structural hierarchy.
The Mitteleuropa Foundation and the Department of Communication of the University of San Marino (Centre of Semiotic and Cognitive Studies) have signed a convention for the coordination of their scientific and training programs. The principal purpose of the convention is to furnish the academic and research community with updates and debate conducted at various levels of detail. The convention covers joint initiatives and projects presented to the public in the name of both organizations. Over the next few years, collaboration between them will centre on the semiotics of new technologies, cognitive semantics and the relationship between language and perception. Further information soon available Main Research ProjectThe Work of ArtIntegrating Ontology and CognitionBasically, works of art are artifacts. This means that they have a two level structure: a material stratum acting as their bearer and a reified intentional stratum acting as their meaning. What distinguishes the work of arts from other kinds of artifacts is the highly sophisticated organization of the reified intentional stratum. We will approach the analysis of the works of art by two different but complementary viewpoints:
The Natural semiosis and the Ontology projects will provide a first concretization of these two viewpoints. The Documentation Center for Central European Culture will provide historical and documentation sources.
(V. Kandinsky) 1. Framework 1. FrameworkFor many decades, during the 20th Century, regarded as irrelevant to the science and/or philosophy of language was the endeavour to bring natural language back to its prelinguistic structure tied to perception and commonsense world, and even more so the attempt to relate it to neurobiological activity. Completely neglected was also the analysis of the morphogenesis and the complexity of the psychic operations, conceptualizations and procedures comprised in linguistic structures, and particularly in natural language. In recent years, however, analysis from the cognitive sciences has influenced linguistics, logic and research into artificial intelligence. All of these disciplines require not only a calculus but also a model of the workings of the human mind. In particular, one of the problems raised by research in the field AI is the complexity of commonsense reasoning and the understanding by machines of natural language, which has prompted new research into systems able to deal with it. Natural reasoning, in fact, involves phenomena such as the free variation of the imagination, creative connections, analogic reasoning, the meaningful use of metaphors, and so on; aspects of thought which have to date been eclipsed by interest in formal-logical reasoning. A number of recent developments in the cognitive sciences, like the semantics of cognitive linguistics, have addressed the problem of the conceptual genesis of meaning on the basis of the structures of cognitive processes, and in particular on that of the structures of spatial perception. An assumption underlying this type of semantics is the claimed continuity between lexicon, morphology and syntax, or rejection of the classical paradigm of the separation between syntax and semantics dominant in the 1900s. Another assumption consists in denying that meaning is the direct expression of ‘states of the world’, or that it is prevalently truth-functional (the hypothesis of the Tractatus), and contending instead that meaning is eminently subjective, dynamic, contextual and largely metaphorical, and that it arises primarily from emotions, sensations, kinaesthesia and the structures of imagery. In other words, the general thesis underpinning this type of semantics is the assumption that conceptualization, in various ways, is the basis for the meaning expressed in natural language, and that it is realized through the multiple embedding of interconnected cognitive spaces. This type of semantics therefore performs a role that goes beyond linguistics in the strict sense and raises philosophical issues of great importance, such as the concepts of scheme, mental image, direct and indirect reference, reasoning by analogy, counterfactual reasoning, and so on. Meaning, for cognitive linguists, is a function of both content and cognitive operations relative to the various forms of mental presentation; it is not an objective or universal level of conceptual representation. From this point of view a cognitive linguistics, and more in general cognitive semantics, are intrinsically phenomenological as regards the problem of reference. Accordingly, in its analysis of the structure of language, cognitive linguistics makes use of concepts drawn inter alia from Gestalt psychology. In other words, it analyses the emergence in the structures of natural language of perceptive fields against the ground of certain construal operations and cognitive distinctions like continuous/discrete, figure/background, closed/open, and so on, which fit well with a phenomenological theory of perceptive and/or cognitive continua. All cognitive linguists share a geometrical conceptualization of language, their main assumption being that spatialization is a necessary condition for the representability of objects, both in conceptual and in semantic spaces. However, notwithstanding the generic description of cognitive space, actually does not exist in the strict sense a scientific theory of cognitive space. Since the cognitive space of primary reference, in particular, is that tied to perceptive processes, which are intrinsecally dynamic, such a cognitive space has to concern the intensity, acceleration, simultaneity and action of the elementary features of perceptual wholes in the time presentness, and their renderings in conceptualization. As to the concept of scheme – which in many respects wrought the cognitive revolution in semantics – it is embraced by all the proponents of cognitive semantics. Cognitive linguistists list part/whole, entity, spatial schemes and schemes relative to distance, as well as schemes relative to force dynamics. 2. Natural semiosisIn accordance with this type of semantics, and in support of the idea that there are primary conceptual schemes in conceptualization, the leading assumption of this project is that the invariants of the perceptive process constitute the connection among the forms of categorization which regulate the meaning of perceptive situations and the linguistic rendering of those same perceptions; in other words, that the invariants of the perceptive domain are transposed into conceptualization in accordance with the principles of gestaltic organization. Consequently, the project intends to verify how and how far natural language is a cognitive activity connected to the structures of primary cognitive processes. From a philosophical point of view, the thesis sustains the anti-reductionist idea of the actual perceptive presentation as the original cognitive space of reference; while from a semantic point of view it argues that, at least at a first level, we say things as we see them. Analysis of this types it implies the existence of a natural semiosis of meaning, at least as regards the primary level of the cognitive processes. As to the idea of cognitive spaces, in particular, the thesis refers to the Aristotelian concept of continua, and considers those aspects of phenomenal experience which are preliminary to a theory of perceptual space. The Aristotelian conception of physics, in fact, is based on primitives and conceptual categories different from those described by modern physics; primitives and categories which also differ from those employed to develop the formalisms available to us today. For example, movement plays a prime role in the Aristotelian conception of perceptive continua, but this is not the objective movement of the laws of classical physics but rather the real perceptive phenomenon of movement as it appears in the various perceptual fields, in the change of place by objects, or even in cases of apparent movements. Shortly, the leading assumptions of the project are:
Finally, the project refers to and is based on experimental studies that have characterized the psychological research who established classical Gestaltpsychologie, and whose ideas are today of great interest to numerous scientists engaged in the analysis of vision. 3. ObjectivesThe initial objectives of the project are primarily theoretical in nature. Once the theoretical framework for analysis of the mechanisms that construct cognitive schemes has been established, work may begin on modelling the results obtained. In analytical terms, the objectives of the project are as follows:
The project will concern itself with the following:
4. A Few PapersAlbertazzi, L. 1997. "Continua, adjectives and tertiary qualities", Axiomathes 8: 7-30. (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf) Albertazzi, L. 1998. "The aesthetics of particulars: A case of intuitive mechanics", Axiomathes 1-2, 169-196. (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf) Albertazzi, L. 1998. "Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning”, in R. Poli (ed.), The Brentano Puzzle, Aldershot: Ashgate, 113-138. (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf) Albertazzi, L. 1999. "The time of presentness. A chapter in positivistic and descriptive psychology", Axiomathes 10, 49-74. (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf) Albertazzi, L. 2000. "Direction and perspective points in spatial perception", in L. Albertazzi (ed.) Meaning and cognition. A multidisciplinary approach, Benjamins Publishing Company: Amsterdam, 122-143. Albertazzi, L. 2000. "Which semantics?", in L. Albertazzi (ed.) Meaning and cognition. A multidisciplinary approach, Benjamins Publishing Company: Amsterdam, 1-24. Albertazzi, L. 2000. "The primitives of presentation. Parts, wholes and psychophysics", in L. Albertazzi (ed.). The dawn of cognitive science. Early European Contributors, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 29-60. Albertazzi, L. 2002. "Continua", Introduction to L. Albertazzi (ed.), Unfolding Perceptual Continua, Benjamins Publishing Company: Amsterdam (Forthcoming). Albertazzi, L. 2002. "Towards a neo-Aristotelian theory of continua: Elements of an empirical geometry", in L. Albertazzi (ed.), Unfolding Perceptual Continua, Benjamins Publishing Company: Amsterdam (Forthcoming). Albertazzi, L. 2002. "Kinetic structures and causatives", Axiomathes 1 (Forthcoming). Albertazzi, L. 2002. "Natural semiosis. The identity of perceptual objects", Versus (Forthcoming). (Click here for a wider list of retrievable papers.) 5. Positions availableA few bursaries will be soon available, starting from September 2003. The successful candidates will be working with Liliana Albertazzi. Applicants should have experience with at least one of the themes above indicated. Applicants should send a CV, a statement of the relevance of their background to the “natural semiosis” project, and contact information for 2-3 referees. Informal enquiries welcome. Visiting PhD students are welcome as well! OntologyAlvísUniversal Categorizer for Domain Modeling
[Alvís is the name of the all-knowing dwarf from the Edda]1. Introduction 1. IntroductionOne of the most striking features of recent developments in science and technology is the over-abundance of information. Unlike the societies of the past, modern ones are no longer afflicted by a lack of information. If anything they suffer from its excess, from having to cope with too much unused and unusable information. It becomes increasingly difficult, in fact, to find the information that one needs, when one needs it, to the extent that one needs it and in the appropriate form. Although the information may be stored somewhere, all too often one does not know where; and even when one is aware of how to find the information, it is often accompanied by further information irrelevant to one’s purposes. And when information is available, it is often forthcoming in the wrong form, or else its meaning is not explicitly apparent. However broad the range of information already gathered may be, a great deal more has still to be assembled and codified. And this inevitably complicates still further the problem of the functional, flexible, efficient and semantically transparent codification of information. The problem is that we have systems rich in information but poor in knowledge. In fact, what seems most dramatically lacking is not information but knowledge. We are in need of tools able to connect information to the items of the world; instruments able to process, translate and deliver information in forms suitable for the problems to be addressed and solved. One cannot achieve the above tasks without knowing the world, its objects, the things and events that occur within it – in one single word, without an ontology. If we consider any two databases, there is no guarantee that their data will be interchangeable. Should it be necessary to use both databases, the data stored in one of them will frequently have to be recategorized so that it can be used by the other. And this is a task that only rarely can be done automatically. Usually, in fact, manual recategorization is necessary; a slow and costly process which is simply impossible in the case of very large databases. And when we think of databases that have taken tens or hundreds years of man-years to compile, the scale of the undertaking is mind-boggling. Ontologies (once constructed) may become the context into which database are merged, thereby modifying their data in order to render them interchangeable. On the other hand, fragile databases, ones intrinsically unable to integrate with other bases, are bound to become rapidly obsolete and to perish. For these reasons, researchers are devoting increasing attention to the development of shared standards and principles of modeling, of semantically transparent languages, and of translation languages. Ontology comes into play whenever (i) one system has to communicate information to another system, and (ii) the two systems are possibly set up in different ways with different data-names, structures and purposes. In this situation, ontology is an instrument with which to give greater robustness to databases. Knowledge about the way the things of the world are constituted may make their codification simpler, more transparent and more natural. As well as the creation of standards and the search for semantic transparency, the development of ontology may also be of service in the construction of more robust products. Not by chance are there broad areas of overlap among the various communities of researchers concerned with the problems outlined above. But as well as facilitating the analysis of objects and products, ontology is also useful for semantic analysis and for automatic language processing – in automatic translation, for example, or in the preparation of abstracts or the compilation of indexes. The usefulness of ontology lies precisely in its ability to render the discourse subject – its structure, its relations with the context and other contexts, etc. – explicit. Consequently, ontology is not merely categorical analysis; it is also a technology. In other words, ontology is not just an attempt to clarify concepts. It also serves for the design and the integration of databases; it also furnishes methodologies and procedures for domain and data analyses. The aspects hinted at above are given diverse treatments in the literature. Although the community of researchers is to varying extents aware of them, one notes the persistence of certain profoundly mistaken beliefs. Ontology is a highly complex area; constructions ‘from scratch’ or work with an exclusively empirical-pragmatic basis solve nothing. But if the task is too demanding for individual groups, then what is required is a general project, a long-term research programme in which different research groups work in coordination, perhaps dividing tasks among them. Responding to difficulties by arbitrarily simplifying the tasks to be accomplished is not to behave responsibly. ‘Doing’ ontology is difficult, because it has a highly complex conceptual structure. Without any awareness of its complexity, it is not possible to devise the most appropriate methods of analysis. On the other hand, it is the world that is complex, and there is no reason why it should be amenable to hypersimplified codification. Miracle-working is not our job. Ontology as categorical analysis (as distinct from ontology as technology) has always been an integral part of philosophical inquiry. ‘Philosophy’, however, is a generic term. There are in effect numerous philosophies which deal with different problems and are characterized by different styles of argument. Non-philosophers are often bewildered by the differences among philosophies and by the ferocious polemics waged by the proponents of different points of view. The diversity among philosophies is not solely diversity among the different branches of philosophy. This is in fact not a problem. Just as there are different branches of mathematics or physics or any other science whose practitioners are often unable to understand each other, so the same situation arises in philosophy without causing difficulties. The issue lies elsewhere. How should we react if someone tells us that there are different mathematics? Not different branches of mathematics but different mathematics. Before crying, take notice that this is precisely what happened with, for example, the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries (or with the distinction among classical and intuitionistic mathematics). The previous situation in which there existed one single type of geometry gave way to one in which the concept of geometry was relativized to diverse contexts. Only subsequently were new forms of synthesis developed. These and other conceptual revolutions in the recent history of mathematical thought generated further tumultuous and exciting developments. A substantially similar situation exists in philosophy. Different philosophical proposals are tied to different contexts of analysis. And just as in mathematics, where the growth of the discipline has singled out a certain number of methods of analysis accepted by the community of mathematicians, so too in philosophy certain methods of analysis are generally accredited by the best philosophers. For this reason, one must learn how to distinguish the historical and conceptual evolution of philosophy from obsolete or amateurish theories revived by the publishing industry or fashion. In the course of its history, philosophy has evolved and matured. However, if one ignores the most important philosophers and concentrates instead on the writings and idiosyncrasies of minor figures or amateurs, it is easy to lose one’s way. Getting to grips with philosophy – in the area of both analytic philosophy and of what is known as continental philosophy – is a frustrating business. Philosophy in the English-speaking world is almost exclusively analytic. It is a philosophical paradigm, by now in decline, whose effort to conduct rigorous and methodologically correct inquiry has been reduced to impotence by a basic mistake. As a matter of fact, analytic philosophy shares with mainstream continental philosophy a basic error whereby ontological problems and inquiries are converted into the problems and inquiries of epistemology. Continental philosophy, besides the epistemological fallacy just mentioned, suffers from at least one further shortcoming, namely its general lack of methodological rigour. If, as we believe, philosophy is naturally allied with science, we may accept Aristotle’s contention that ontology is philosophia prima as regards the problems it seeks to resolve, as long as we remember that it can only be philosophia ultima as regards the elaboration of results. And it is here that we discern how philosophy concretely operates in harness with science. Moreover, the philosophers to whom we refer can only be philosophers who have acknowledged that alliance. I set out earlier one of the reasons why mainstream analytic and continental philosophy seem unsuitable for our purposes. We must accordingly take a step backwards and see whether other philosophical viewpoints have something useful to offer. And, in fact, we find in the German-speaking philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a group of thinkers who defend the two principles of alliance with science and the autonomy of ontological problems. The latter principle states that ontological problems cannot be reduced to those of the theory of knowledge. This position was first set out by Franz Brentano, who declared in the fourth of his Habilitation theses that “the genuine method of philosophy is none other than that of natural science” (Brentano 1968), and it was developed in numerous directions by scholars like Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, Roman Ingarden, and Nicolai Hartmann, perhaps the most important ontologist of the Twentieth century. Philosophers in the English-speaking world who have argued substantially similar positions – although ones not directly influenced by the above authors – have been Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead. Much of the decadence of contemporary philosophy is attributable to the fact that the two most influential philosophers of the last fifty years – Wittgenstein and Heidegger – rejected the alliance between science and philosophy. One can only hope that contemporary philosophers will come to realize that they have blundered into a blind alley and will revert to a more natural standpoint. 2. ObjectivesThe reaserch project in ontology developed at Mitteleuropa Foundation is based on the following assumptions (further information can be found in the papers listed in section 3 below): a) Information should be distinguished in Semiotical, Ontological and Semantical (the SOS model). Each of them requires specific tools of analysis and modeling. b) The three above-mentioned types of information can be analysed in three different ways, termed descriptive, formal and formalized. With reference to the ontological component, the difference among descriptive, formal and formalized attitudes is the following. Descriptive ontology concerns the collection of prima facie information either in some specific domain of analysis or in general. It may collect information about material things, plants and animals, as well as about the products of the talents and activities of animals and humans in the world. Formal ontology distills, filters, codifies and organizes the results of descriptive ontology (in either its local or global setting). According to this interpretation, formal ontology is formal in the sense used by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. Being ‘formal’ in such a sense therefore means dealing with categories like thing, process, matter, form, whole, and part. These are pure categories that characterize aspects or types of reality and still have nothing to do with the use of any specific formalism. Formal codification in the strict sense is undertaken at the third level of theory construction: namely that of formalized ontology. The task here is to find the proper formal codification for the constructs descriptively acquired and formally purified in the way just indicated. The level of formalized constructions also relates to evaluation of the adequacy (expressive, computational, cognitive) of the various formalisms, and to the problem of their reciprocal translations. Most contemporary theory recognizes only two levels of work and often merges the level of the formal categories either with that of descriptive or with that of formalized analysis. As a consequence, the specific relevance of categorical analyses is too often neglected. The three levels of ontology are different but not separate. In many respects they affect each other. Descriptive findings may bear on formal categories; formalized outcomes may bear on their twin levels, etc. To set out the differences and the connections between the various ontological facets precisely is a most delicate task. c) Whatever exists has temporal and spatial extension. If time has any ontological priority over space, processes have a corresponding ontological priority over things. Therefore, the category ‘process’ is somewhat deeper-lying than its twin category ‘thing’. As a matter of fact, things themselves are processes. No real item is ever contained in any single temporal point. All real items therefore present an inherent temporal extent. Moreover, items can exert some influence providing they acquire some degree of stability. This is the basic tenet of our vision. d) As far as Formal (or Categorical) Ontology is concerned, it is customary to distinguish between what is under analysis and its determinations. As a matter of fact, a number of deep problems are embedded even in this first move. Let's nevertheless agree in leaving them aside for a while. By resorting to a traditional way of speaking, I shall address the first topic as the problem of "substance", and the second one as the problem of "determinations". The basic point is that the theory of substance comprises at least three sub-theories: the theory of particulars, the theory of levels of reality and the theory of wholes and their parts. The theory of particular distinguishes between stuffs, processes, and objects; the theory of the levels of reality analyses the strata and layers of reality and their many forms of dependence; the theory of whole sand their parts studies and classify kinds of wholes, parts, echelons and their boundaries. The failure of most traditional theories of substance is precisely due to their lacking one or more of the above sub-theories. Furthermore, we distinguish an elementary theory of substance, given by the above-mentioned three sub-theories, from a non-elementary or higher-order theory of substance, given by the study of their interactions. Passing to determinations, they may be classified according to two main oppositions: the determinable/determinate opposition and the intensive/extensive opposition. e) Specification of a general methodology for domain analysis. From an ontological viewpoint, at least two major aspects should be addressed: (i) The universal basic structure of a domain, and (ii) The basic schemes of the domain's prototypical items. Let's see them in a nutshell. Ad (i) It is proposed to distinguish between a domain's external, internal and mixed dimensions. To help understanding, the idea may be exemplified by considering the domain of sport. Internal dimension considers information related the concrete performing of any sport. External dimension regards everything related to the organization, the establishing of norms, the study of sports. Mixed dimensions concern areas of systematic overlapping with other domains (law, medicine, press, etc). Ad (ii), the prototypical item of the domain of sports is given by the match. A match has a material basis (field, ring, gymnasium, etc.), and instances various contents (the ideas of competition, challenge, win, etc). The event “match” produces a few outcomes (at least, it has a result). In its turn, the category match is a whole composed by a number of participants: athletes, referees, technicians, fans. (i) and (ii) together provide a general template of the domain and its main singularity (or focus of information). In their turn, domain categories providing the structure (i) and (ii) are based on ontological categories. 3. A few papersThe topics presented in section 2 are analyzed and discussed with more details in the following retrievable papers: R. Poli, "Ontology for Knowledge Organization", in R. Green (ed.), Knowledge Organization and Change, Frankfurt /Main, INDEKS Verlag, 1996, 313-319 (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli, "Iconic Graphs. An Exercise in Topological Phenomenology", Axiomathes, 1997, 8, 1-3, pp. 455-472 (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli, "Levels", Axiomathes, 1998, 9, 1-2, pp. 197-211 (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli and G. Mazzola, "Semiotic Aspects of Generalized Bases of Data", in E. Kawaguchi, H. Kangassalo, H. Jaakkola, I.A. Hamid, eds., Information Modelling and Knowledge Bases XI, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000, pp. 1-11 (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli, "Foreword", Axiomathes, 2001, 12, 1-2, pp. 5-9 (.htm). R. Poli, "Descriptive, Formal, and Formalized Ontologies" (forthcoming) (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli, "Ontological Methodology" (forthcoming) (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). R. Poli, "The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality", Axiomathes, 2001, 12, 3-4, pp. (.rtf) (.zip) (.pdf). (Click here for a wider list of retrievable papers) 4. Standard Template LibraryIt is entirely obvious that ontology qua technology is still in its early stages. At the moment, the research community seems to have reached broad agreement only on the fixing of formal standards. In this area, KIF has become an accepted standard of exchange and translation. This is certainly an important development, but it is one that can be called authentically ontological only by illegitimate extension of the concept of ontology. Formal languages are part and parcel of formalized ontology, but they cannot be extended to cover the fields of neither descriptive nor categorical ontologies. In other terms, what we really need is a Standard Template Library for ontological categories and constructs: to use, for example, in structuring analysis of the LEVELS of objects and their forms of dependence and independence, in analysis of categories like PROCESS, OBJECT, GROUP, PART and WHOLE. Moreover, we need semiotic and semantic frameworks. As a matter of fact, it would be extremely useful to have templates for analysis of the categories used to recognize and classify reality, just as it is essential to have sophisticated tools for the analysis, construction and organization of lexical fields. All this, however, still seems a long way off. And this is no accident: we have a long way to go because, amongst other things, there is still no general consensus even on the general features of an ontology and on the features of whatever should accompany ontological analysis. For this reason the most urgent task is to continue with the work of conceptual clarification of categories and of their organization. In effect, it is plain that each of the topics addressed in the various sections of this paper calls for further inquiry, and that several areas of ontology have yet to be explored. If we look at the literature we soon realize the extent to which analyses have lacked systematicity. For instance, whereas in the last fifteen years there has been an enormous burgeoning of interest in the concept of PART, this is certainly not the case of the correlated and ontologically more important concept of WHOLE. 5. Positions availableA few positions will be soon available, starting from September 2003. The successful candidates will be working with Roberto Poli. Applicants should have experience with at least one of the themes above indicated. Applicants should send a CV, a statement of the relevance of their background to the ontology project, and contact information for 2-3 referees. Informal enquiries welcome. Visiting PhD students welcome as well!
Documentation
Center for Central European Culture
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| Year | Name | Period | Research Program |
| 2003 | Alan Cruse | April-May | (Soon available) |
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